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Abstract 
Facing multi-challenges from population aging, from SOE restructuring, and 
from WTO accession, China is undertaking a major revamping of its pension 
system. In 1997, a new partial funded pension system was legislated in China. 
This system composes of "three pillars": a social basic pension mixing pooling 
with individual accounts, a supplementary pension funded by enterprises, and a 
pension based on individual voluntary savings. After several years practicing, this 
new system is still underdeveloped and has many problems to be solved. 
This thesis uses both quantitative and qualitative analytical methods. It 
reviews the economics of social security pensions in general, analyzes China's 
pension reform in particular — historical development, current situation and future 
issues, estimates its impact on household savings, discusses its interaction with 
financial market, and presents the experiences and implications of Chilean and 
Singaporean pension reforms. 
ii 
Base on LCH model, the empirical study in Chapter 4 shows for the first time, 
that the old PAYGO pension system in China has a positive effect on household 
consumption, that is, a negative effect on household savings. Whereas much of 
the literature found that FF pension schemes in both developed and developing 
countries potentially increased private savings. Therefore, we conclude that the 
new pension reform in China, a transition from PAYGO to FF system, may boost 
savings thus be conducive to financial market development and long-run economic 
growth. 
At present in China, both pension system and financial market are undergoing 
massive restructuring, and the vigorous interaction between the two has not yet 
formed. The keys to future development are: deepening pension reform, 
pre-funding IDP through securities market, improving pension fund management 
and regulation, relaxing pension fund investment, fostering mutual funds and 
commercial insurance companies, and making use of foreign capital and skills. 
Moreover, the experiences of Chile and Singapore have valuable implications for 


























The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Dr. Wang You-Qiang, the 
Supervisor of this paper, Economics Department, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, for his helpful assistance and constructive supervision in going through the 
various chapters of this paper. 
The paper has also been prepared with the support and encouragement from 
Dr. Tsui Kai-Yuen and Mr. Ho Yin-Ping, Economics Department, The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, to whom the author is grateful for being the internal 
committee members, and for their valuable criticisms and suggestions. 
vi 
Table of Contents 
English Abstract ii 
Chinese Abstract vii 
Acknowledgements vi 
Table of Contents vii 
List of Graphs and Tables ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Social Security and Savings 3 
2.2 Pension Funds and Financial Markets 10 
2.3 China's Pension Reform 14 
Chapter 3: China's Pension Reform 
3.1 The Evolution of Pension System 18 
3.2 The Background for Current Reform 21 
3.3 The New Pension System 27 
3.4 Key Issues for Future Reform 31 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Pension Reform on Private Savings in China 
4.1 The Theory 36 
4.2 The Model 40 
vii 
4.3 Data and Methodology 45 
4.4 Empirical Results 49 
Chapter 5: The Interaction between Pension Reform and Financial Market in 
China 
5.1 The Effects of A Funded Pension System on Financial Market 53 
5.2 Pension Reform and Financial Market in China 59 
Chapter 6: Experiences of Chile and Singapore and the Implications for China 
6.1 The Pension Reform in Chile 69 
6.2 The Central Provident Funds in Singapore 70 
6.3 The Implications for China 71 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 76 
Bibliography 79 
Data Appendix 85 
viii 
List of Graphs 
Graph 1: The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Consumption 86 
Graph 2: China's Population Age Structure 87 
Graph 3: Population Trend and Dependency Ratio of China (1970-2050) 88 
Graph 4: The Interaction between Pension Funds, SOE Reform and Financial 
Market in China 89 
Graph 5: Urban Unemployment by Sector in China (1978-2000) 90 
Graph 6: The Structure of China's Current Pension System 91 
Graph 7: Contributions and Benefits of China's Current Pension System 92 
Graph 8: The Trends of Chinese Yuan Term Variables 93 
Graph 9: Financial Assets Distribution in China (end of 1993 and 1996) 94 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Growing Imbalance between Workers and Pensioners in State-owned and 
Collective Enterprises of China 95 
Table 2: Regression Results - Model I 96 
Table 3: Regression Results 一 Model n 97 
Table 4: Private Pension Funds in Latin American Countries 98 
Table 5: Pension Fund Assets in OECD Countries (as percentage of GDP) 99 
ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
China is undertaking a major revamping of its economic system. WTO 
accession is highlighting the necessity for further reorganization of economic 
structure. In particular, social security reform and financial market reform are the 
key components because they are vital for failure or success of other reforms. 
At present, China faces a decline in both domestic and export demand. 
Stimulating consumption thus becomes the goal of economic reform in the short 
run, but it will reduce savings to some extent. In the long run, the goal of reform 
is to maintain a high economic growth rate which needs a high savings rate. 
The impact of pension system on savings is clearly an important issue in the 
context of concern about economic growth. China's pension system is 
experiencing dramatic transition from a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)' to a fully funded 
(FF)2 plan. It is interesting to know whether the old PAYGO pension system in 
China depressed private savings, and whether the transition will boost savings in 
the long run. In order to achieve successful transition of pension system, China 
‘pension scheme wherein retirement benefits are paid from contemporaneous taxes with 
workers paying pensioners directly. 
2 pension scheme where pension commitments are covered by real or financial assets. 
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has to get sustainable support from its financial market. Therefore, the interaction 
between pension reform and financial market reform is another focus of the study. 
In Chapter 2, we review the literature on pension economics, including the 
impact of pension system on private savings, the linkage between pension funds 
and financial markets, and China's pension reform. Chapter 3 discusses the 
history of China's pension system, the background for the current reform, the new 
"three-pillar" system, and future issues concerned. The impact of China's pension 
reform on household savings is estimated based on LCH model in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the interaction between the pension system and financial market 
in general, and the case of China in particular. The experiences of pension 
reforms in Chile and Singapore and the implications for China are presented in 
Chapter 6，followed by a conclusion of Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Social Security and Savings 
During the past decades, debate has focused on whether or not the PAYGO 
social security system (including pension system) has depressed private savings, 
and whether or not the FF system has boosted private savings. Overall, economic 
theory provides neither an a priori argument for a strong negative effect of PAYGO 
system or a strong positive effect of FF system on savings, nor decisively rules out 
an important influence. The crucial issues are empirical. Most empirical studies 
are based on PAYGO system while a few based on FF system, and most are done 
for the U.S. while a few for other countries. There is no empirical study on the 
impact of China's social security (pension) system on savings. 
2.1.1 Studies for the U.S. Based on PAYGO Schemes 
Modigliani and Bromberg (1954), and Aiido and Modigliani (1963) advanced 
the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) that provides the most common framework for 
applied analysis of social security. The basic notion is that consumption spending 
will be smooth in the face of an erratic stream of income (see Graph 1). Based on 
LCH, they presented the results of a number of empirical tests for the United States 
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and derived some important implications. The most obvious one is that social 
security, by providing income during retirement, reduces the amount of saving 
during the working years. 
In a pioneer study using the U.S. time series data for the period 1921-1971, 
Feldstein (1974) estimated that the introduction of the social security system has 
reduced private savings in the United States by 50%. He stated that, under the 
life cycle hypothesis, a PAYGO pension scheme has dual effects on private savings. 
One is asset substitution effect that would reduce savings: social security reduces 
private savings through it substitutes for household assets that provide income 
during retirement. The other is known as induced retirement effect that would 
increase savings: people who are covered by the retirement scheme have an 
incentive to retire earlier so that they can receive the pension. He estimated the 
consumer expenditure function by adding a social security variable to capture the 
net effect. The empirical results for the period 1929-71 show that social security 
wealth has a positive effect on consumption, but it is not significant for postwar 
period 1947-71. 
Subsequent empirical study by Munnell (1976) did a similar work and came to 
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a similar conclusion. However, she ran regression with personal savings but not 
consumption as dependent variable. Moreover, she included two more variables 
to capture the induced retirement effect and asset substitution effect separately. 
The regression result implies that there is a negative substitution effect while a 
positive induced retirement effect of social security on savings. On balance, 
social security wealth is estimated to have negative effect on saving but the 
magnitude is much smaller than Feldstein (1974). 
The empirical results of Barro (1978) offer no support for the hypothesis that 
the social security program depress saving. Barro reaffirmed his conclusions after 
a careful interpretation of Feldstein's empirical results. He argued that the 
assumption of no intergeneration transfer in Feldstein (1974) is unrealistic. Such 
kind of transfer will affect the impact of social security wealth on private 
consumption. 
Darby (1979) analyzes the same basic data as do Feldstein and Barro. 
However, he estimated a permanent-income consumption function, differing from 
previous studies based on life-cycle functions. The basic difference between 
permanent income and life cycle models is primarily in techniques of estimating 
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wealth. His empirical results do not support the hypothesis that the social security 
program results in decreased saving. 
Kotlikoff (1979) presented new micro evidence on the accumulation of 
households to social security. He considered not only the intra-generation transfer 
but also the intergeneration transfer. His empirical results showed that social 
security tax contributions have reduced private savings of the young but the 
coefficient of net social security wealth is not significant, and that the introduction 
of social security would not induce early retirement. 
The new evidence of Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) cast doubt on the conclusion 
of Feldstein (1974) and discovered a computer programming error in it. The 
replicated empirical work does not provide statistically significant support for the 
hypothesis that the social security decreased private saving. Leimer and 
Richardson (1992) combined the life cycle with altruistic consumption behavior^ 
They addressed the problem of no bequests in the life cycle model. Using the U.S. 
cross sectional data, their model stated that a dollar of social security wealth 
substitutes for about three-fifths of a dollar of fungible assets. 
3 all kind of private transfers that offset behavior in responses to social security and 
other government transfers. 
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Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) studied the effect of social security on savings 
based on the traditional framework of Overlapping Generation Model (OLG) of 
exogenous growth. Considering the impact of intergenerational redistribution on 
welfare, they found that a PAYGO social security system is equivalent to cutting 
taxes significantly for an extended period of time in its ability to crowd out savings. 
Responding to those doubts cast on his 1974 study, Feldstein (1995) 
reexamined his 1974 paper and extended the sample period to 1992. Moreover, 
additional variables, such as government budget surplus and real per capita 
disposable income were added. The new results still agreed with his original 
conclusion. 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) checked the robustness of the findings of 
Feldstein (1995) by imposing two restrictions. Their results suggested that the 
effect of social security wealth on consumption rises with the level of wealth, and 
that the effect is very sensitive to the specification of consumption function. 
2.1.2 Studies for Other Countries Based on PAYGO Schemes 
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Boyle and Murray (1979) presented an empirical analysis of the influence of 
public pension plans exerting on household savings in Canada. Followed the 
LCH model adopted by Feldstein (1974) and Munnell (1974), they found that 
Canadian public pension plans have no visible effect on household saving behavior. 
Barro and Macdonald (1980) extended the base of empirical evidence by 
examining the behavior of consumer expenditure in 16 industrialized countries 
over the period of 1951-1960. The cross-country evidence provides neither 
support nor refutation of the hypothesis that social security depresses private 
savings. 
Datta and Shome (1981) analyzed the substitutability between noncompulsory 
savings and compulsory savings for 5 Asian countries. It was found that there is 
no significant relation between the two variables using a two-stage least square 
estimation. 
2.1.3 Studies Based on FF Schemes 
With the popularity of FF social security system during the trend of population 
aging around the world, some studies become interested in analyzing the impact of 
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FF schemes on private savings. 
Pesando (1992) focused on US defmed-benefit (DB)^ funds. He suggested 
that an increase of around 0.35 in personal saving is resulted from every unit 
increase in pension fund assets, though the cost to the public sector of the tax 
incentives to pension funds reduces the overall benefit to national savings to 
around 0.2. Hubbard (1986) suggested a larger effect on personal saving of 0.84, 
Gale (1997), rather less. Effects may be less marked for defined-contribution 
(DC)5 funds. 
Loh and Veall (1985) studied the effect of Singapore's Central Provident 
Funds (CPF) on aggregate savings. The results indicate that pension savings have 
negative impact on private consumption, that is, a positive impact on private 
savings. World Bank (1993) found similar effects in Singapore. 
Chan (2000) compared two similar pension schemes: Mandatory Provident 
Funds (MPF) in Hong Kong vs. CPF in Singapore, and made empirical study of the 
4 pension scheme where the benefits are defined in a fixed formula by the sponsor in 
advance, usually based on years of service and average or final salary, independent of the 
contribution rate and asset returns. 
5 pension scheme where only contributions are fixed, and benefits therefore depend solely 
on the returns on the assets invested, usually based on regular contribution of a fixed 
proportion of salary. 
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impact of CPF on private savings in order to forecast the impact of the new 
established MPF. The results show that the CPF system increased private savings 
in Singapore. Therefore, a positive impact of MPF in HK is forecasted. 
Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) studied the pension reform in Chile based 
on the OLG model of exogenous growth. Econometric evidence suggests that a 
reform from PAYGO to FF could raise substantially long term growth and could be 
contributing to Chile's large increase in private savings. Morande (1998) also 
found a positive effect of pension reform on savings in Chile. 
Samwick (2000) analyzed the effect of social security on savings using a panel 
of countries over 25 years. Little evidence shows that countries that implement 
defined-contribution (usually FF) reforms have higher trends in saving rates after 
reform. Cross-sectionally, countries with PAYGO tend to have lower saving rates, 
and this effect increases with the coverage rate^ in the system. 
2.2 Pension Funds and Financial Market 
The linkage between pension funds and financial market (particularly capital 
6 percentage of the working population covered by pension plans to the total population. 
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market) has become a perennial question since the private funded pension emerged. 
Studies on this issue have formed a new research branch: pension finance. 
Bodie (1990) analyzed the institutional forms that private retirement plans 
take, and how they affect capital markets. Among the effects of funded pension 
plans on the capital market, he highlighted the impact on financial innovation. 
Lakonishok, Sehleifer and Vishny (1992) examined potential conflicts of 
interest between pension plan sponsors and the managers of pension fund assets. 
They showed that active money managers tend to underperform compared to a 
benchmark passive investment strategy of indexing. Moreover, they suggested 
that the persistent use of active management despite such evidence might be due to 
conflicts of interest. 
Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993) criticized former studies that do not 
adequately adjusted for risk, and that do not distinguish selectivity and market 
timing. They found some evidence of good performance on a risk-adjusted basis, 
and therefore implied that active management is not entirely futile. 
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Davis (1995) offered an overview of the economic issues relating to the 
development of funded pension schemes. He analyzed both the economic theory 
of pension funds and experience regarding social security, as well as the structure, 
regulation, and performance of pension funds in 12 OECD countries. The 
principle focus is on the implications of the development of pension funds for 
financial markets. He also predicted that institutional investors including pension 
funds would affect current financial system substantially. 
Davis (1996) sought to address the evolution of financial structure in the 
major OECD countries from a relatively novel perspective. He maintained that 
the development of institutional investors, especially pension funds, has been a 
much-neglected driving force in financial change. 
Davis (1998) discussed the effects of pension fund growth on financial 
markets. He concluded that pension reforms that introduce elements of funding 
might have powerful effect on financial market development, improving the 
performance of the functions of financial markets and potentially boosting savings, 
albeit also having some potential side effects that may warrant vigilance. 
12 
Monks (1997) noted that pension funds now typically hold such a substantial 
proportion of corporate equity that they are increasingly forced to take a stance on 
issues of corporate governance. Accordingly, funds are demanding and receiving 
better information and more leverage over management both in the U.S. and 
internationally. 
Reisen and Williamson (1997) addressed the issue of whether pension funds 
should be limited in their international investment. They found that international 
diversification by pension funds fosters stock market integration rather than interest 
rate linkages, so it does not limit short-term monetary sovereignty. 
Vittas (2000) argued that pension funds neither necessary nor sufficient for 
capital market development. Other forces, such as advances in technology, 
deregulation, privatization, foreign direct investment, and especially regional and 
global economic integration, may be equally important. But if pension funds are 
subject to appropriate regulations, adopt optimizing policies, and operate in a 
pluralistic structure, and when they reach critical mass, they can have a large 
impact on capital market modernization and development. 
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2.3 China's Pension System 
In China, there are few studies on pension system before 1995 because of the 
underdeveloped level and planned economy structure. However, with market 
economy oriented and pension reform deepened in recent years, issues related to 
China's pension system soon become hot topics in Chinese academia and also draw 
attentions from foreign researchers. Most studies now focus on the issues such as 
the options for China's pension system, suggestions for its current reform, and 
relations with financial market development. These researches are largely 
descriptive but not quantitative due to data limitation. 
World Bank (1997) diagnosed pension system for Chinese government, 
recommended a unified three-pillar system that includes both a mandatory funded 
individual account and a social insurance scheme, and argued that China's 
transition costs are lower than other countries that have similar transitions. In 
addition, the financial implications were simulated, a sustainable contribution rate 
was endorsed, and risks associated with low compliance rates and low interest rates 
were also examined. To a large extent, China's current pension reform is 
following the recommendations of World Bank (1997). 
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Song and Chu (1997) examined the characteristics of the pre-reform social 
security system in China with respect to the old-age insurance. Recent efforts 
towards old-age insurance reform were discussed and commented on. 
Furthermore, recommendations were proposed for the current reform. 
Martin Feldstein (1998) analyzed the economics of PAYGO and 
investment-based (funded) pension systems in the Chinese context, and calculated 
the advantage to China of using an investment-based portion. Several options for 
reform were also considered. 
Li (1998) made a pilot study on the linkage between pension system and 
capital market in China. He analyzed the nature of China's pension system, 
deliberated the relationship between pension system and capital market from the 
view of pension system functions - saving, redistribution, and insurance, and 
provided reform advice. 
West (1999) looked more closely at the motivations for current reform, and 
assessed the progress of reform and remaining issues to be tackled in designing the 
new pension system for China's current and future economy. The sustainability 
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and unification of the pension system were two major concerns. 
Yi (2000) analyzed and assessed the options for China's pension reform, and 
focused oil the financial effects of pension reform on financial markets. The 
linkages between pension system and savings, between pension funds and financial 
system, financial innovations and financial supervision, were discussed in details. 
Liu and Mackellar (2001) studied key issues of aging and social security in 
China. They looked at the challenges facing in the areas of old-age pensions, 
health care and disability services, and presented ad hoc projections of pensions 
and health spending and the number of disabled persons. They concluded that 
rising demand in these sectors has the potential to give China the social insurance 
spending profile of a developed country while it is still at the level of developing. 
James (2001) described the historical background of old-age security in China, 
examined the new multi-pillar system, and analyzed three key implementation 
problems that remain to be solved: the transition cost conundrum, the tensions in 
unifying the fragmented system, and the difficulty in investing pension funds 
productively and earning a high rate of return. 
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Wang (2001) analyzed the interaction between pension system and capital 
market development in China. He concluded that China's determination to 
establish a partial funded "three-pillar" pension system is the first step in the right 
direction. He pointed out that, without the separation of individual accounts from 
the social pooling, the pre-funding of implicit pension debt (IPD), and 
improvements in pension fund management and regulation, the pension system and 
capital market development will not be sustainable. 
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Chapter 3: China's Pension System 
3.1 The Evolution of Pension System 
As in other countries, old-age protection has long existed in China and certain 
practice can be traced back for thousands of years. However, it was no more than 
family support and charity to most Chinese before 1951. The formal pension 
system of China generally experiences a four-period development after 50 years 
evolving. 
3.1.1 The Establishment Period: 1951-1966 
In 1951, The state council issued The Labor Insurance Regulations and 
initiated a formal pension system on a PAYGO basis. Under planned economy, 
the pension system was no more than an urban "Iron Rice Bowel" phenomenon 
with characteristics of "low wages, high employment, high subsidies, and high 
welfares" [MOLSS (2000)]. Pensions covered only employees in the state-owned 
sector who enjoyed cradle-to-grave benefits. 
Benefits depended on standard wages and total working years. The system 
was funded exclusively by contributions from enterprises. 70% of the 
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contributions were retained locally while 30% were transferred to a national pool. 
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions managed both the local payment and the 
pool. Subsequent reforms expanded coverage. The 1955 and 1958 reforms set 
up a system for not only employees of enterprises, but also those of government 
units, nonprofit units, and party organizations [World Bank (1997)]. 
3.1.2 The Destructive Period: 1966-1978 
During the Cultural Revolution, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and 
the Ministry of Labor were abolished. Supervisory responsibilities were 
transferred to local labor bureaus, while responsibility for managing payments was 
transferred to enterprises. Pooling ended and so did pre-funding, since each 
enterprise paid the pensions of its own workers out of current revenues. 
3.1.3 The Recovery Period: 1978-1991 
When the economic reforms began in 1978, The state council issued new 
pension regulations (Document 104), which recommended bringing in large 
collective enterprises. The retirement age was affirmed at 60/55 for men/women. 
Eligibility requirements were eased and benefits were raised. These contributed 
to a rapid increase in retirees and pension costs. 
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State Council Document 77 of 1986 established pension pool across 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the municipal level. This is an important 
transition for pension system from enterprise protection to social protection. It 
was accompanied by employment reforms that established contract labor. 
Separate pension pools were established for contract workers and permanent 
workers. In the late 1980s, pooling was extended to the collective enterprises in 
many cities. Since then, other enterprise types have been brought into pension 
pools in some cities, although participation is far from complete. Some provinces 
are moving toward provincial level pooling, generally only for SOEs. 
3. 1.4 The Development Period: 1991-Present 
In 1991，State Council Document 33 called for individual contributions by 
workers in addition to enterprise contributions, and for experiments including a 
role of individual accounts. It also proposed an expansion of pooling and the 
establishment of "three pillars" pension system: a social basic pension managed by 
the state, a supplementary pension funded by enterprises, and a pension based on 
individual savings. 
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State Council Document 6 of 1995 further proposed two models for the social 
basic pension: one emphasized funded defined-contribution and the other allowed a 
greater role for defined-benefit. City and prefecture governments were given the 
right to select one of the two or design a third variant. However, this proposal led 
to fragmentation, multiple plans and confusion. 
In 1997 with State Council Document 26, the government defined more 
narrowly what the outlines of the new system should be, aiming at unifying the 
fragmentary system at provincial level. In 1998, a new ministry, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) was established to supervise the new system. 
As for the structure and features of the new system, details will be presented in 
Section 3.3. 
3.2 The Background for Current Reform 
Pension system is one of the first components of the social security system in 
China to be selected for reform. In order to better understand the current reform, 
it is necessary to have a picture of the background, which includes demographic 
trends, economic reforms and other reforms. 
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3.2.1 Demographic Trends 
Fast speed of aging 
Because of an increasing life expectancy and declining mortality rate, a baby 
boom in the 1950s and 1960s, and especially the "one-child policy" in the late 
1970s and 1980s, China's population is aging more rapidly than other countries. 
It took most OECD countries 80-100 years to double the proportion of their old 
people to 18%, while China will do that in just 34 years [World Bank (1997)]. 
The present bulges in the population structure at the young working age level will 
have shifted close to or into the retirement age groups by 2025 (see Graph 2) [West 
(1999)]. 
High absolute number of elderly population 
According to the National Population Census of China in 2000, the 
population aged 65 and over reached 88 million, accounting for 7% of the Chinese 
population. Thus, China accounts for half of elderly population in Asia, and for 
one-fifth of the entire elderly world population. UN projects the percentage of 
people aged 65 and over in the total Chinese population will reach around 22.6% in 
2050. 
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Increase of the “oldest old" 
The nature of demographic aging in China and around the world is that the 
"oldest old" population, say the population above 80 or 85, is growing much more 
rapidly than the conventionally labeled "elderly" population as a whole. In 1990, 
there were around 8 million persons aged 80 and over in China, in 2000 about 28 
million - a near tripling in only ten years. 
Rising aged dependency ratio 
Based on UN projections, the aged dependency ratio? will rise from about 
10% in recent years to almost 40% in 2050, with the phase of most rapid increase 
between 2015 and 2040 (see Graph 3). Moreover, due to population aging and the 
liberalization of eligibility criteria, the system dependency ratio^ rises sharply (see 
Column a, Table 1), much more rapidly than the rise of the aged dependency ratio. 
Spatial imbalances in aging 
China has long been characterized by a pronounced rural-urban development 
gap. China's urban sector is leading the way in terms of population aging. 
According to the Sample Survey on Population Changes in 1999, the highest age 
7 the ratio of population aged 65 and over to population aged 15-64. 
8 the ratio of number of pensioners to number of workers. 
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dependency ratio was 19.01% in Shanghai, while the lowest was 6.68% in Ningxia. 
The degree of regional difference makes it especially difficult to create a nationally 
pension policy. 
3.2.2 Economic Reforms 
Economic reforms have been going on in China since the late 1970s. 
Pension reform is a key issue because of its close connections with other reforms. 
In this section, we draw attention to the economic reforms, especially to SOE and 
financial market reforms and their links with pension reform. 
State-owned enterprise reform 
The heavy pension obligations (see Column b, Table 1) are slowing down the 
process of SOEs reform. Liquidation^, joint ventures and mergers of SOEs cannot 
proceed unless the issue of the pension obligations is settled. However, pension 
reform itself cannot solve the problems of SOEs. Property right reform - sale of 
assets of small and medium sized SOEs and joint stock of large sized ones - may 
be the essential solution to SOEs restructuring. Pension funds, as institutional 
investors on capital market, will play a significant role in SOE restructuring; in turn, 
9 sale of a defaulting borrower's assets and distribution to creditors. 
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the expanding scale of listed SOEs will speed up creating more investment 
instruments for pension funds. 
Financial market reform 
Pension funds investment requests for innovations of financial instruments 
and improvement of financial supervision, thus will stimulate financial market 
reform. Financial market reform, in turn, will provide more investment options 
for pension funds diversification, increase investment returns, and reduce transition 
costs. The details of the interaction between pension reform and financial market 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The relationship between pension reform, SOE reform and financial market 
reform is illustrated in Graph 4. On one hand, through investing in financial 
market, pension funds will provide capital for SOE restructuring and thus boost 
SOE reform. On the other hand, pension funds investment will increase financial 
innovation, enhance financial regulations, and thus deepen financial market 
reform. 
3.2.3 Other Reforms 
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Labor market reform 
Change in employment structure (see Graph 5) - an increase of the share of 
non-state sector - contributes to the decline of pension coverage in urban area. 
Another issue is that early retirement resulted from high unemployment pressure 
raises pension cost, which makes further reform more difficult. Change in wage 
composition 一 a decline in the standard wage relative to the total remuneration -
results in a sharp fall in the income replacement rate'^. That fragmented pension 
system discourages labor mobility is another important issue. 
Reform of government institutions 
In China, there are typically several decision makers for one task, often 
without a coherent policy, leading to a lengthy decision making process with less 
than satisfactory results. In the case of pension reform, at the national level, the 
Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the 
Ministry of Finance, the System Reform Commission, and State Planning 
Commission have all historically been involved in policymaking and system 
management. An important step in institutional reform is the establishment of 
MOLSS in 1998，which aims at unifying pension policy and giving coherent 
10 ratio of pension to earnings at the point of retirement. 
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pension management. 
3.3 The New Pension System 
3.3.1 The Three-Pillar Pension System 
As mentioned before, current pension system (See Graph 6) consists of three 
pillars, which are financed by the employer, employee, and the government through 
a combination of pooled funds and individual accounts. Pillar I is a social basic 
pension, which is mandatory, defined-benefit, and publicly managed; Pillar n is a 
supplementary pension funded by enterprises; and Pillar III is a pension based on 
individual voluntary savings. At present, emphasis continues to be placed on 
designing the first pillar, which is to provide a minimum standard of living for 
retirees. The other two pillars have just begun and are expected to develop 
slowly. 
It should be noted that, a partial funded pension system has not yet taken 
shape until now, and the pension assets available to capital market investment are 
quite limited, largely due to notional individual accounts and the underdeveloped 
supplementary corporation pension schemes. In most areas, the social pooling 
funds and individual accounts in the basic pension schemes are not completely 
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separated; rather they are mixed together, that is, the money in the individual 
accounts can be used to cover the shortfall in the social pooling funds, thus leaving 
the individual accounts empty. Therefore, the new pension system is in fact a 
PAYGO one for the time being. 
3.3.2 Pooled Funds and Individual Accounts 
The most important feature of the new system is that Pillar I is a partially 
funded scheme, mixing a defined benefit (DB) PAYGO portion, pooling funds, 
with a defined contribution (DC) funded portion, individual account. The relative 
emphasis on the two components varies by locality. 
3.3.3 Contributions 
A regionally based pension pool is replacing the employer as the focal point of 
the pension system. Pension pools are being formed for administrative areas 
(usually cities or counties; a few at province level). Employer contributes no 
more than 20% (usually 17%) of their total wage bills, most part to pension pool, 
others to individual account. Individual account is set up for each worker. It is 
an 11% contribution of worker's wage, made up of 4% by the employee and 7% by 
the employer. The employee's contribution is gradually increased by 1% every 
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two years to 8% of wages, and the employer's contribution decreases 
correspondingly until to zero. (See Graph 7) 
3.3.4 Benefits 
Workers who started working after implementation of the "three-pillar" 
system qualify for a monthly basic pension after 15 consecutive years of service. 
This basic pension consists of two parts: one paid by pension pool and calculated 
as 20% of the average monthly wages in the locality where the employer operates, 
the other paid monthly by the accumulated individual account contributions 
divided by 120. (See Graph 7) The replacement rate is estimated to reach 
58.5%. Workers who retired before the reforms were implemented continue to be 
paid pensions according to the previous rules of the State Council, and the 
replacement rate was about 80%. 
3.3.5 The National Social Security Fund 
In September 2000, the National Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF) 
was established. This is a constructive step toward unifying pension system. 
The NCSSF is assigned the task of managing the National Social Security Fund 
(NSSF), which is a pool of assets coming from state-owned asset sales, fiscal 
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appropriations, and the issuance of lottery tickets. In principle, the NCSSF 
delegates management to qualified asset managers, but is not involved in the direct 
investment management of the NSSF. Furthermore, NSSF is allowed to invest in 
a broader marketplace, say stock market, therefore could become the largest 
institutional investor in China. 
3.3.6 The Liaoning Experiment 
In 2001, the State Council launched a pension reform experiment in the 
northeastern province -- Liaoning, whose situation is typical and representative in 
China. This pilot province, the center of the rusty industrial belt with 40 million 
people, was the only one selected to establish a new independent province-level 
pension system with diversified funding channels and socialized management in 
three years. Compared with the national pension reform in 1997, the 
contributions of the enterprises to the social pooling in Liaoning Experiment 
increase from 17% of the employees' payrolls to 20%, while the contributions to 
the individual accounts, now completely the obligation of the employees, drop 
from 11% to 8%. A supplementary corporation pension scheme, in the form of 
individual accounts, is encouraged and will be managed in a market-oriented 
manner. The most noteworthy aspects of this experiment are the consolidation of 
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the social pooling and the separation of the individual accounts from the social 
pooling, which are essential measures to establish a real partial funded pension 
system. 
3.4 Key Issues for Future Reform 
3.4.1 Unifying the System 
China's pension system is featured by high degree of fragmentation. The 
previous wide dispersion of authority over pension policy and administration, and 
the excessive dispersion of authority to lower levels of government, contributed to 
the fragmentation. At present, there are hundreds of pension schemes across the 
country. The fragmentary, decentralized pension schemes become impediments 
not only to pension reform itself but also to other reforms. The government is 
making many efforts on unifying the pension system, such as establishing NSSF, 
launching Liaoning Experiment, and even drafting a national social security law. 
3.4.2 Financing the Transition 
One big problem that Chinese officials face is how to finance the transition. 
Estimating transition cost needs to calculate the implicit pension debt ( I P D ) ' � 
” t h e present value of the benefits that would have to be paid to current pensioners and 
that have been accrued by current workers. 
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Transiting from a PAYGO to a partially or FF pension system makes the implicit 
1 '•y 
debt explicit. IPD is most commonly calculated on termination hypothesis . 
Among the calculations on China's IPD, there are two representatives: one 
calculated by World Bank, estimating an IPD of 1900 billion yuan in 1994, the 
other by MOLSS with an estimation of 2800 billion yuan in the same year. The 
difference of 900 billion yuan is due to the different assumptions of the two models. 
The low IPD in China (around 50% of GDP compared with 100-200% in OECD 
countries) makes it relatively easy to finance the pension obligations. The 
feasible financing instruments for China are issuing government bonds, selling off 
state assets of a liquidated enterprise, and issuing lottery tickets. 
3.4.3 Reducing Pension Costs 
One step is to increase retirement age. The current official retirement age, 
60/55 for men/women, was formulated in 1951 when life expectancy is about 50 
years (now about 71 years). Though controversial on increasing the retirement 
age to what level, it is commonly accepted to gradually not abruptly increase it 
over a number of years. However, in fact, many SOEs have surplus labor and are 
tempted to deal with it by retiring elderly workers early. This dilemma should be 
12 an assumption that the unfunded system would be terminated immediately and that all 
pensioners and workers would have to be compensated for their future pensions and 
accrued rights. 
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solved otherwise pension costs cannot be cut down. Another step in reducing 
pension costs is to lower replacement rate. The replacement rate in China's 
pension systems, at more than 80%, is high by international standards. There is a 
broad consensus that it should gradually be brought down to about 60% of wages 
(net of payroll taxes). Reductions in replacement rate should be in consistent with 
the development of Pillar n and Pillar III of the current pension system. 
3.4.4 Expanding Coverage 
Future expansion in urban will primarily bring in workers in private, joint 
venture and foreign invested enterprises. In rural areas, expending coverage to 
farmers and township and village enterprises (TVE) workers would be desirable for 
their old age security and for the transition to a new pension system. The problem 
is that these enterprises with low pension coverage are also the most dynamic. 
The high contribution rates in the state sector cannot simply be extended to the 
non-state sectors; otherwise, it will substantially increase labor costs for these 
dynamic enterprises. The key may be to set a low mandatory contribution rate, 
while allowing for the special needs through a supplementary scheme. 
3.4.5 Indexation of Pensions 
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Indexation method'^ is a complicated matter. Current pension system seems 
to provide for indexation of pensions to wages. Specifically, regions are supposed 
to index pensions according to 40-60% of regional nominal wage growth. This 
means that indexation varies in different areas and has an idiosyncratic relationship 
with inflation [James (2001)]. When inflation is high, as in the early 1990s, 
benefits cannot keep up with prices, while when inflation is low, as recently, 
benefits rise faster than prices. For example, suppose that nominal wage growth 
is 10%, made up of 2.5% price inflation and 7.5% real wage growth. If indexing 
to 50% nominal wage growth, pensions would rise 5%, which is twice as the 
inflation rate; if inflation is 7.5% and real wage growth 2.5%, pensions would not 
keep up with the inflation. In China, the real wages are expected to rise fast (5% 
or more for ten years or longer). Therefore, a more affordable adjustment 
mechanism would be full indexation to the consumer price index. 
3.4.6 Investing Pension Funds 
In order to honor the promises of obligations to pensioners, it is desirable to 
invest pension funds in capital market to achieve appreciation. An adequate 
� r u l e s that benefits are increased in line with prices or wages. 
14 means whereby assets are accumulated to cover or provide collateral for pension 
benefits, or an institutional investor that involve in management of assets on the capital 
market. 
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regulatory framework with effective supervision and enforcement, as well as a 
financial market that offers a range of liquid investment instruments, are essential 
for pension funds investment. A set of efforts on regulating pension fund 
investment and management has been made by the government: guidelines for 
corporate governance of listed companies are being drafted, stock market indices 
are being developed, the first open-ended mutual fund was created, and a new trust 
law safeguarding supplementary pension funds took effect. Policies on 
diversification and competitive management are also under government's 
consideration. 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Pension Reform on Private Savings in China 
4.1 The Theory 
The unfunded "pay-as-you-go" method of financing social security is an 
implicit form of deficit finance that has transferred immense sums from current 
younger and future generations to current older generations as well as recently 
deceased generations. Such intergenerational redistribution may reduce savings in 
life cycle models because of generational differences in marginal consumption 
propensities. Moreover, if the asset substitution effect outweighs the induced 
retirement effect, savings will be also halted. To illustrate the above argument, 
we adopt the Life Cycle Hypothesis of Ando and Modigliani (1963). 
The model starts from the utility function of the individual consumer: his 
utility is assumed to be a function of his own aggregate consumption in current and 
future periods. The individual is then assumed to maximize his utility subject to 
the resources available to him, his resources being the sum of current and 
discounted future earnings over his lifetime and his current net worth. As a result 
of this maximization, the current consumption of the individual can be expressed as 
a ftinction of his resources and the rate of return on capital with parameters 
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depending on age. The individual consumption functions thus obtained are then 
aggregated to arrive at the aggregate consumption function for the community. 
4.1.1 Assumptions 
(1) The utility function is homogeneous with respect to consumption at different 
points at time. 
(2) The individual neither expects to receive nor desires to leave any inheritance. 
(3) The consumer at any age plans to consume his total resources evenly over the 
remainder of his life span. 
(4) Every age group within the earning span has the same average income in any 
given year t. (b) In a given year t, the average income expected by any age 
group T for any later period r, within their earning span, is the same, (c) 
Every household has the same total life and earning spans. 
(5) The rate of return on assets is constant and is expected to remain constant. 
4.1.2 Derivation of Aggregate Consumption Function 
In any given year t, total consumption of a person of age T will be 
proportional to the present value of total resources accruing to him over the rest of 
his life: 
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cj = n^vj (1) 
Where Qf is a proportionality factor, c j stands for the total consumption in the 
year t. The present value of total resources at age T , v] , can be expressed as 
the sum of net worth carried over from the previous period, a j_� , and the present 
value of nonproperty income the person expects to earn over the remainder of his 
life: 
恭 （2) 
Where yf denotes current nonproperty income; y f ' is the nonproperty income 
an individual of age T expects to earn in the r th year of his life; N stands for 
the earning span and r, for the rate of return on assets. Define yf as the 
average annual expected income: 
1 N ,.eTr 
yf = — ! — y ^^ T � 
We can rewrite (1) as: 
c T = n ^ : / , + � [ N - T � y f + � a f _ \ (4) 
To obtain an aggregate consumption equation, we proceed to aggregate equation (4) 
first within each group and then over the age groups. 
If Q^ is identical for all individuals in a given age group T，then: 
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C 了 = - + Q ： 】 ; ( 5 ) 
Where Cj, y ,， Y f， a n d are corresponding aggregates for the age group 
T of c], yj，yf，and a二,. Next, aggregate them over all age groups to get 
the consumption function for the whole community. 
C, = a;Y, + a'^Y' + (6) 
where C,, Y,, and are obtained by summing respectively C厂，Y,, 
Y''''，and over all age groups T , and represent therefore aggregate 
consumption, current nonproperty income, expected annual nonpropeity income, 
and net worth. 
The measurement of expected nonperoperty income, Y: , is not directly 
observable. One simple hypothesis is to assume the expected nonproperty income 
is the same as actual current income: 
r； = PX ； y ^ ' - l (7) 
Substituting (7) into (6), we obtain the aggregate consumption: 
C = {a\ + p'a\)Y, + = a , + 
a, = a ; + p'a^ « a\ + a ; , a^ = (8) 
This formulation is designated as Hypothesis I 
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We may also hypothesize that for those currently employed, average expected 
income, y ; , is current income adjusted for a possible scale factor: 
Where E, is the number of persons engaged in the production. We should 
expect to be quite close to unity. Suppose that some of the currently 
unemployed persons would expect their current unemployment status to continue 
for some time and possibly to recur: 
[ - 崎 
Where y^" is the average expected income of unemployed persons, and P2 is 
expected to be substantially smaller than p^. The aggregate expected income is: 
r； = E,y： + {LrE,)yT =五,A + (A - 现 f -
= (9) 




The formulation embodied in equation (10) is designated as Hypothesis II. 
4.2 The Model 
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The form of the consumption equation employed in this paper is a simple 
linear regression that follows closely with Barro and Macdonald (1980), which is 
based on a life cycle consumption model of Ando and Modigliani (1963). The 
functional form is: 
{CIY),=a,+a,{GIY),+a^{Y,_JY,)^-a,{\IY),^a,{PEIY),+ a,DR, + a,UR, (11) 
The expected signs of the coefficients in equation (11) are: 0 < < 1; 
> 0 or a , < 0 ; > 0 ; a � > 0 ; > 0 or < 0 ; > 0 or < 0 ; 
a^ >0. The interpretations are as follows: 
The intercept, a^ , is the short run marginal propensity to consume and 
therefore should be within 0 and 1. 
The impact of government consumption G, on private consumption C丨 is 
examined by inclusion of G/Y. The indecisive nature of a, is viewed along 
the lines discussed in Bailey (1971) and Barro and Macdonald (1980). For 
example, during the economic depression, household consumption would contract 
while the government consumption would expand, therefore a, is expected to be 
• negative. However, during economic boom, both household consumption and 
41 
government consumption may increase simultaneously, so a^ can be positive. 
The lagged income variable y,.； / Y, and the unemployment variable UR丨 
are cyclical measures intended to account for any differences between current and 
permanent income. For a given value of income 7,，UR, and would both 
tend to be positive predictors of future income, the a^ ^ and a^ coefficients 
should both positive. In the present empirical analysis, it turns out that the lagged 
value of income is unimportant once the unemployment rate is included. 
Equation (11) implies that the consumption-income ratio C / 7 is 
independent of income scale. However, if higher income is associated with a 
lengthening of the relative amount of time spent in retirement, an increase in real 
income would raise the desired ratio of wealth to income and thereby reduce the 
steady state value of the consumer spending-income ratio. This effect can be 
explored by entering the variable 1 / 7 , and by checking for a positive effect on 
C / r , that is, > 0 . 
The pension expenditure variable PE, is included to test the basic 
hypothesis that the expected retirement benefit would make impact on private 
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consumption and thereby on private saving. Whether the impact is positive or 
negative depends on the offset net effect of asset substitution effect and induced 
retirement effect, hence a^ is ambiguous. 
The effect of the age variable DR丨(dependency ratio) on private 
consumption is difficult to interpret. When the fraction of retired people to total 
population rises, there would be an increase in wealth-income ratio, that is, a 
decrease in consumption-income ratio. Therefore a^ would be negative. On 
the other hand, for a given set of saving plans and a given steady-state age 
distribution, an increase in the current ratio of retired persons to total population 
would increase the fraction of people who have a high propensity to consume, so 
that would be positive. 
Because most rural areas in China are not covered by the current pension 
system, the pension expenditure is largely paid on pensioners in urban sectors. In 
order to see the impact of pension reform on savings in the whole country as well 
as in urban areas, we will run two regressions: one is regressing national household 
consumption on government consumption, GDP, pension expenditure, dependency 
ratio, and unemployment rate; the other is regressing urban household consumption 
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on government consumption, urban disposable income, pension expenditure, 
dependency ratio, and unemploynient rate. The two regressions are specified as 
follows: 
Model I (National): 
= + a^g, + + a,y,+a,pe, + a,DR, + a,UR, + s, (12) 
Where 
c,=(C/7X； g,=(G/n； 少，=(1/7,); pe,={PE,IY,) 
C, is the household consumption at time t 
G, is the government consumption at time t 
Y, 二 GDP丨 is the gross domestic product at time t 
= is the lagged gross domestic product at time t 
DR, is the dependency ratio at time t 
UR, is the unemployment rate at time t 
s, is the disturbance term (residuals) at time t 
Model n (Urban): 
c: = « 0 + + 少二 1 + + + a,DR, + aJJR, ( 1 3 ) 
Where 
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c:=(C/n; gXG/V),； yl, =(¥,_,/¥,)； yXVY,); pe:=(PE,/Y,� 
C, = UC丨 is the urban household consumption at time t 
y, = DY( is the urban disposable income at time t 
= DY,_^  is the lagged urban disposable income at time t 
G" DR,, UR, and s, are the same as those in equation (12) 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 The Data 
On one hand, China's pension reform before 1978 was very slow and 
controlled by the planned economy thus has less value for our study. On the other 
hand, China's pension system has still been a PAYGO scheme until 2000 since 
individual accounts are actually nominal as noted in Section 3.3. Therefore, we 
choose the period of study from 1978 to 2000. Annual data are used, most of 
which come from China Statistical Yearbook (various editions), with the exception 
that data of GDPD-1 from the Database of Economics Department of CUHK, data 
of household consumption and government consumption from China Economic 
Yearbook (2001)，and data of unemployment rate from China Labor And Social 
Security Yearbook (2001). 
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Income 
In Model I , for data unavailability, gross domestic product (GDP) is used 
instead of national disposable income, while in Model E，urban disposable income 
is used. GDP is calculated by expenditure approach, referring to the final 
products of all resident units in China during a year; urban disposable income 
refers to the actual income of the urban resident households that can be used for 
daily expenses. 
Consumption 
Household consumption is used instead of private consumption for the rule of 
consumption classification in China. It refers to the total expenditure of resident 
households on the final consumption of goods and services, composing of urban 
household consumption and rural household consumption; government 
consumption refers to the expenditure on the consumption of the goods and 
services provided by the government to the whole society. 
Pension 
Pension expenditure is the only available consistent variable in China that can 
be used as the proxy for the expected retirement income. It refers to the total 
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current amount of pension benefits paid by employers and government on the 
retired and resigned staff and workers. Since the data of population aged over 65 
before 1987 are not consistently available, we cannot use the variable of social 
security benefits relative to population over 65 as did Barro and Macdonald (1980). 
Age variable 
System dependency ratio is used instead of the aged dependency ratio also 
because there is no consistent data of population aged over 65 before 1987. It is 
defined the number of pensioners as percentage of the number of staff and workers. 
Unemployment Rate 
Urban registered annual unemployment rate is used. It refers to the ratio of 
the number of the registered unemployed persons to the sum of the number of 
employed and registered unemployed persons in urban area. 
All Chinese yuan term variables are converted to 1990 constant price by GDP 
deflator (GDPD) in Model I and by consumer retail price index (CRPI) in Model 
n . Two GDP deflators, GDPD-1 and GDPD-2，are used in Model I (A) and 
Model I (B) respectively, because they come from different data sources: the 
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former from Econ Database of CUHK while the latter from China Statistical 
Yearbook. GDPD and GRPI are calculated as below: 
GDPD = GDP—, X100 and CRPI = �肥 一 ^ • 
GDP 龍 CRPI 職 
All the following Chinese yuan term variables refer to the real ones if not 
mentioned. 
4.3.2 The Methodology 
The methodology of this paper mainly follows Chan (2000). The specific 
procedures are shown below. 
Non-stationary variables ‘ scaling-down 
The time series data of Chinese yuan term variables in China all show upward 
trends, that is, are not stationary (see Graph 8). To reduce the incidence of 
spurious correlation, all potentially non-stationary variables are scaled down by 
GDP in Model I and by urban disposable income in Model n ^^ 
Diagnostic test 
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) test to check for the classic assumptions 
of the linear regression model: normality, zero mean, homoscedasticity, 
orthogonality, and non-autocorrelated errors of the residuals e, • 
15 An alternative procedure, based on unit root and co-integration tests and a dynamic 
error-correction specification, is not feasible due to the short sample period to which the 
model is applied [Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994)]. 
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Higher-order serial correlation test 
Using Langrange Multiplier (LM) statistic to test the hypothesis that the 
disturbance s, are serially uncorrelated against the alternative hypothesis that 
they are autocorrelated of order p . 
Estimation 
After confirming the order of serial correlation, using the autoregressive error 
test (Exact ML method when p<2 or Cochrane-Orcutt method when p<\2)Xo 
estimate the parameters under the assumption that the disturbance s, follows 
stationary process with stochastic initial values. 
Variable deletion test 
Deleting those insignificant variables to check for the robustness and 
significance of the remaining variables. 
4.4 Empirical Results 
The basic empirical results are contained in Table 2 and Table 3. They show 
that the signs of all estimates agree with the expected signs, except a^ in Model 
I (A) and a � i n Model n (a) & (b)，and that the signs of a , , a^ , a^ and 
in Model I are not consistent with those in Model H • As expected, the focus 
variable, pension expenditure, PE, has a positive impact on household 
consumption in all models. Moreover, this impact is significant in all models 
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except Model I (A). Therefore, for the first time, this paper shows that the old 
PAYGO pension system in China depressed household savings significantly during 
the period of 1978 to 2000. 
Consider, first, the sign of the intercept term are positive between 0 and 1 in all 
models, but its magnitude is smaller in Model H than in Model I • It implies that 
higher percentage of income can be consumed in the whole country than in urban 
areas, maybe because the national income level is much lower than the urban one. 
Second, the coefficient of government consumption GlY is significant in all 
models, but it is negative in Model I while positive in Model E . It means that 
government consumption has a negative impact on household consumption in 
national level but a positive impact in urban level. This maybe due to the better 
economic performance in urban areas compared with the whole nation, or due to the 
use of government consumption instead urban government consumption in Model n . 
With respect to the cyclical variables, the lagged income variable has a 
significantly positive coefficient in all models except Model I (B-a). However, the 
magnitude is smaller in Model I (B) than in other models, possibly resulting from 
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V 
using GDPD-2, whose variation is bigger than GDPD-1 and CRPI. The 
unemployment rate variable is positive as expected in all models except Model I (A), 
reflecting the cyclical effect on consumption, that is, an increase in unemployment 
rate makes consumer anticipate an increase in future income, thus raise consumption. 
The nonhomogeneity term, 1/7,, is positive and significant in Model I , 
indicating some negative effect of income level on the consumer spending-income 
ratio in the whole country. However, it is negative and insignificant in Model n . 
With regard to the variable of greatest current interest, PE/Y interpret the 
results of both Model I and Model n . Applying national variables, Model I shows 
that the coefficient of pension expenditure is ranging from 1.9938 to 5.3535, which 
means increasing 1% of pension expenditure in total income will raise household 
consumption about 2-5% in total income. With t-ratio equals to 1.3191, this 
positive effect is insignificant in Model I (A). However, with t-ratios ranging from 
3.2144 to 6.0385, it is significant in Model I (B) even after removing the 
insignificant variables / Y^，DR丨 and UR,. Model n uses variables such as 
urban household income and urban disposable income to capture the impact of 
pension reform on private savings in urban sectors. The coefficient of pension 
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expenditure is positive and significant, ranging from 2.3395 to 3.6830, with t-ratios 
from 2.5123 to 5.5940. Therefore, both Model I and Model n show a positive 
effect of pension benefits on household consumption, that is, a negative effect on 
household savings. 
Finally, the age variable DR shows a negative effect on consumption with a 
quite small magnitude in all models except Model I (B-a) and (B-b). This implies 
that an increase in the fraction of retired people to total population would raise 
wealth-income ratio, that is, decrease consumption-income ratio slightly. It 
should be noted that the effect of dependency ratio is significant in Model I (A) 
and Model n，but insignificant in Model I (B). 
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Chapter 5: The Interaction between Pension Reform and 
Financial Market in China 
On one hand, international experience shows that a funded pension system has 
profound impact on the financial market. This is evident in developed countries, 
where pension funds are the key institutional investors in capital markets. Recent 
years have also witnessed pension reforms and rapid development of financial 
market in some Latin American and East European countries. On the other hand, 
without a supportive financial infrastructure and sound financial regulation, a 
funded pension system on its own cannot go too far. Overall, pension fund 
growth tends to shift financial markets towards a "capital market oriented" stage of 
financial development, where the functions of the financial system at least in some 
ways be more efficiently than in an economy dominated by banks [Davis (1998)]. 
This chapter analyzes the interaction between the pension system and financial 
market development in general, and the case of China in particular. 
5.1 The Effects of A Funded Pension System on Financial Markets 
5.1.1 The Effects on Savings: Quantitative 
Under a FF pension scheme, since the present value of the expected pension 
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benefits should be equal to the present value of the contributions, no net social 
security wealth would be been created. In addition, there is no intergenerational 
transfer unless government intervenes. Consequently, the establishment of FF 
pension system should not reduce savings. At the extreme, it can only fully 
substitute the private saving thus increase aggregate savings [Chan (2000)]. 
Though much of the literature noted in Section 2.1.3 suggest that growth in 
funded pension schemes does appear to boost private saving both in both 
developed and developing countries, this promotional effect is still unclear and 
hotly debated. However，there can be little doubt that funded pension schemes 
lead to a big increase in long-term financial savings that can underpin capital 
market development. The size of accumulated long-term funds depends on the 
maturity of the schemes, their coverage, the contribution rate, and the investment 
rate of return [Vittas (1996)]. The past decades have witnessed an explosion of 
pension assets (see Table 4 & 5). 
5.1.2 Other Effects on Financial Markets: Qualitative 
Stabilizing forces 
Because of long-term investments and predictable trading styles, pension 
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funds are believed to be the stabilizing forces on securities markets. Different 
from speculators and other strategic investors, pension funds are managed by 
professional institutions and focused on long-term rate of return and diversified 
risks. As institutional investors, they have advantages in capital base, transaction 
cost, information, professional knowledge, and psychology over small and medium 
investors, thus are beneficial to increase rational investment and reduce speculation. 
For instance, during the 1988-1992 period in Chile, the stock market variation 
coefficient^^ was only 1.92, far lower than that of Mexico (2.44), Argentina (3.25), 
Peru (3.73), and Brazil (4.46)，where pension markets were not yet flourishing 
[Sanchez (1998)]. However, it should be noted that, dynamic herding induced by 
frequent performance checks against the market, as well as the increase of pension 
funds maturity, may contribute to the higher volatility of the UK and US in the 
1980s [Davis (1995)]. 
Countervailing forces 
One of the main benefits of pension fund growth is the intensification of 
competition in financial system. Facing the countervailing force of institutional 
investors, the dominant commercial banks are forced to become more competitive 
16 ratio of the variance of monthly average returns of the market index to the monthly 
average returns. 
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and to start seeking out their customers rather than waiting for prospective 
borrowers to visit them. This change in bank behavior seems to have taken place 
in 1940s and 1950s in the U.S., followed a decade or so by other Anglo-American 
countries, and in subsequent years by most developed and developing countries 
[Vittas (1999)]. The development of pension funds also contributed to the advent 
of competitive bidding for corporate issues of securities. The greater availability 
of financial resources encouraged corporations to place new issues directly within 
the institutional investor, to replace sole management of their public issues by 
several joint lead managers, and to invite competing syndicates of underwriters 
[Chemow(1990)]. 
Modernization of market trading 
Pension funds also exert pressures on modern and efficient trading facilities. 
The large amount of investment of pension funds in securities markets resulted in 
substantial improvement in market infrastructure in terms of a central depository 
agency, settlement and clearance system, bookkeeping system, etc, and the 
improvement in market infrastructure led to a more efficient trading system 
characterized by low transaction costs, high transparency, high liquidity, and low 
volatility. For instance, the use of bloc trading led to the abolition of minimum 
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commissions and restructuring of stock markets in many countries around world. 
The Chilean electronic securities market established in 1989 reduced bonds trading 
costs from 0.015 in 1985 to almost zero at present [Wang (2001)]. 
Acceleration of financial innovation 
Financial innovation is vital for financial market development. The demands 
of institutional investors including pension funds for high investment returns, low 
risks and low trading costs are the important momentum for financial innovation. 
As pension funds grow in size and relative importance, new instruments were 
developed to meet their needs and to fill perceived gaps in the markets. In OECD 
countries, pension funds' need for hedging shortfalls of assets against liabilities has 
led to the development of number of recent financial innovations such as zero 
coupon bonds and index futures [Bodie (1990)]. In Chile and Argentina, the 
development of mortgage bonds, corporation bonds, and public agency bonds 
markets has been largely contributed to pension system reforms. Recently, the 
emergence and growth of venture capital and infrastructure funds in these countries 
have been created by the encouragement of pension investment [Wang (2001)]. 
Reinforcement of financial regulation 
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The safety and profitability of pension funds are critical to the pensioners' 
benefit and social stability, thus posing increasing demands for sound financial 
regulation. Several years ago, in Chile, Argentina, and other countries where the 
pension systems were overhauled, concrete steps were taken to strengthen 
information disclosure, fiduciary口 duty and crackdown on insider trading, and 
out-of-line self-dealing so as to achieve better investor protection. A 
comprehensive risk evaluation system was established in Chile to compensate for 
the disadvantages of private risk rating agencies and for the convenience of pension 
funds to choose appropriate investment instruments [Wang (2001)]. 
An increasing role in corporate governance 
The role of pension funds in corporate governance has evolved in line with 
their growing importance as corporate owners. As long-term investors and 
shareholders, pension funds pay close attention to the management of invested 
companies. In the U.S., public pension funds are more active in corporate 
governance. Among large corporations, pension funds as well as other 
institutional investor owned in 1988 86% of the equity of Amoco, 82% of General 
Motors, 74% of Mobile and 70% of Citicorp [Vittas (1999)]. Pension funds 
17 individual having power, control, management, or disposition with regard to US pension 
fund's assets, hence covered by ERISA. 
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collaborate with one another to exert pressures and even exclude unqualified 
management, and to protect shareholders' interests in M&A and other major events. 
The growing role played by pension funds in corporate governance may be a big 
plus in the improvement of listed companies and the healthy development of a 
securities market. 
5.2 Pension Reform and Financial Market in China 
The World Bank estimates that, if the new partial funded "three-pillar" 
pension system in China proceeds smoothly, the total pension assets will reach 
US$1.8 trillion in the year 2030, from which the financial market may benefit 
greatly due to the continuing inflow of capital. However, both the new pension 
system and the financial market are still very underdeveloped, which may impede a 
positive interaction between the two. 
5.2.1 Financial Market Development in China 
The non-financial institutions: at preliminary stage 
At present, financial institutions still dominate financial system in China, 
while non-financial ones are very underdeveloped. In 1996, the assets of 
depositary financial institutions account for 92.1% of the total, while others just 
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7.9%. Moreover, among the depositary financial institutions, the share of 
state-owned commercial banks preponderates over other banks and credit 
companies (see Graph 9). This situation makes serious negative effects on the 
efficiency of financial system: banks' deficits become larger and larger, enterprises 
lack of capital for further development, and enterprise funding structure is distorted. 
Therefore, it is crucial to develop various kinds of non-fmancial institutions, say 
contractual financial institutions and investment financial institutions. At present, 
insurance companies suffer a lot from a low interest rate and limited capital; mutual 
funds have just emerged for a short period and thus are immature; trust and credit 
companies go through restructuring because of poor operations. In a word, 
non-fmancial institutions in China are still at preliminary stage of development. 
The securities market: in poor situation 
Since Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges were established in 1990, 
China's securities market has experienced a rapid explosion. By the end of 
October 2001, there were over 1,152 domestic listed companies and 65 million 
investors with total market capitalization of 4.37 trillion yuan [Xinhua News 
Agency (Nov. 14, 2001)]. However, the securities market is generally in a poor 
situation, plagued with many long-lasting problems. Firstly, there is an 
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unbalanced development. Bonds market lags behind the stock market, among 
which corporation bonds market lags behind state bond market. In addition, the 
secondary market is underdeveloped and lacks liquidity compared with the primary 
market. Secondly, strong non-market forces interfere in the market development. 
For example, the government rules the scale, method and variety of issuing bonds 
as well as the quota of issuing stocks. Thirdly, the secondary market has 
pervasive speculation and large fluctuations. There have been three major 
fluctuations of the securities market within a decade, i.e., 1993-94, 1996-97, and 
2001-02, which is much more frequent than the developed countries and even 
many developing countries. Fourthly, low quality of listed companies, simple 
investment instruments, weak investor protection, poor risk control in securities 
firms, and loose financial regulation seriously damaged the development of 
securities market, thus critically need be improved. 
5.2.2 Pension Funds Development in China 
Ineffective pension fund management and low returns 
At present, in sharp contrast to international norms, pension fund management 
and surveillance are combined together in China, taken charge by Social Security 
Offices at various administrative levels. This results in weak information 
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disclosure and poor monitoring, hence, leads to the embezzlement of pension fund 
assets. It is estimated that there were more than 10 billion yuan pension losses at 
the end of 1997 [Kong (1997)]. Moreover, given the restriction that pension funds 
can only invest in government bonds and bank deposits, and the downward trend of 
interest rates in recent years, the profitability of the pension funds is rather 
worrisome. A path-breaking event for pension funds investment did take place 
when NCSSF and NSSF were initiated in 1998. It is believed that such a reform 
will have strong implications for the management of the pension assets in the 
individual accounts. 
Lack of appropriate institutions for pension management and services 
At present, there are no professional, market-oriented pension fund 
management institutions in China. The potential important players in pension 
management are commercial insurance companies and mutual funds management 
companies. However, they are rather small and lack economies of scale, 
compared with their international competitors. Moreover, their capital bases are 
also very weak. It is estimated that the shortage of capital in China's insurance 
companies will reach 12 billion US dollars or more in the next five years [Wang 
(2001)]. In addition, these commercial companies lack asset management 
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experience as well. Although insurance funds were allowed to enter stock 
markets by purchasing mutual funds at the end of 1999, the investment instruments 
of insurance companies are still very limited, and the fostering of qualified asset 
management professionals will take some time. There are 33 close-end funds in 
China, which are worth about 10 billion yuan and operated by 14 fund management 
companies. The performance of the mutual funds has not been as good as 
expected: in the first half of 2001，only 5 of them outperformed the stock markets; 
even worse, 13 funds had negative returns [Chen (2000)]. 
5.2.3 Pension System and Financial Market Reforms: Realistic Choice for China 
Deepening the pension reform through capital market 
Given the absence of well-developed financial market in China, some people 
argue that it is too early to talk about a transition to funded pension system. In 
fact, this view is shortsighted and ignores the dynamic interaction that is likely to 
develop between pension funds and capital markets [Vittas (2000)]. The 
accumulation of pension fund assets takes some time, only a small amount of 
which can initially be invested in the securities market. Therefore, the 
government still has time to standardize and develop the securities market, and the 
investment restrictions can be relaxed step by step in light of the situation in the 
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securities market. At the early stage of the pension system reform, the badly 
needed fund management experts and skills can be imported from abroad by 
establishing joint venture asset management firms, which is likely to take place 
after China's accession into the WTO. At present, the new pension reform should 
be further deepened, and the most urgent steps are to separate the individual 
accounts from the social pooling, and to bring individual accounts into the 
supplementary corporation pension schemes [Song et al. (2000)]. 
Pre-funding IPD through securities market 
Without the pre-funding of IPD, it is impossible to establish a sustainable 
pension system, let alone to boost the financial market. In China, among various 
proposals for IPD funding, such as levying special taxes, issuing lottery and 
recognition bonds, soft loans, the most promising and feasible one is the sale of 
state-owned assets. There are several potential ways to sell the state-owned 
assets. The first is initial price offering (IPO). In July 2001, the first four listed 
companies sold state-owned assets in this way, collecting 3.4 billion yuan. The 
second way is state-owned shares sales of listed companies. According to State 
Council Document 22 of 2001, a very limited number of the state-owned shares of 
listed companies may be transferred to other shareholders in the same companies or 
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may be repurchased by the company. The scale and timing is to be decided by the 
authorities, depending on the situation in the stock markets [Fan (2000)]. Selling 
SOE asset to listed companies is the third method. A listed company acquires part 
of the stakes in a SOE with the proceeds from the share floatation. The earnings 
from the SOE asset sales are turned over to the Ministry of Finance, and then to 
NCSSF. The fourth is SOE asset sales to private investors. This cannot be 
carried out on a large scale because of difficulties in precise asset valuation and 
concerns about losses of state-owned assets. In short, no matter what measure is 
taken, it should be implemented in a transparent manner and comply fully with the 
law. 
Improving pension fund management and regulation 
The fundamental objective of pension fund management should be made 
clearly by legislation, and a sound fund management structure should be set up. 
Although the basic pension schemes are publicly managed, they should also be 
managed in a professional manner. As NCSSF builds up its management 
capacities, it may be assigned the task of individual account management. The 
bottom lines are sufficient market competition, rigorous regulation, and sound 
internal risk control systems of fund managers. After the establishment of 
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supplementary corporation pension schemes, corporation pension management 
committees may be responsible for the delegation and surveillance of fund 
management by themselves. At the same time, through nurturing market 
intermediaries, including actuary, accounting, auditing, and risk rating agencies, the 
operation of the pension funds can be monitored more effectively. 
Relaxing pension funds investment 
At present, a certain percentage of commercial insurance funds are allowed to 
invest in mutual funds, and pension funds follow suit. The NSSF is allowed to 
invest not only in state bonds and bank deposits with a bottom of 50%, but also in 
mutual funds and stocks with a cap of 40% [Xinhua News Agency (Dec. 19, 2001)]. 
In addition, a pilot program of private open-end mutual funds that are specifically 
directed against pension funds is carried out at this stage. The pros of such 
mutual funds should include easy purchase and redemption of the shares, simple 
implementation of private placement, low sales costs, and convenient surveillance 
by pension funds. 
Developing commercial insurance and mutual funds industries 
To be more capable of withstanding risks, it is urgent for insurance companies 
66 
to strengthen their capital bases by listing domestically or internationally. Given 
the insurance companies' pressing demand for capital and the long process before 
listing in the domestic stock markets, international listing may be considered to be 
a more realistic alternative. Moreover, to improve their profitability and build up 
asset management professionals, insurance companies should be allowed to invest 
in a much wider range of financial instruments. Under the Principle of Business 
Separation and international practice, a pilot program is carried out whereby an 
insurance company and an asset management company are set up separately under 
a single holding company. Furthermore, to increase their competitiveness quickly, 
the insurance companies should be encouraged to expand by M&A on a 
market-oriented basis. 
For mutual funds, it is essential to create more financial instruments, such as 
stock market index futures, for the purpose of risk arbitrage. The mutual fiind 
management fees, which are relatively high compared with international standards, 
should be lowered even further. Meanwhile, the supervision of the mutual fund 
management companies should be strengthened by revising related out-of-date 
legislation and cracking down on the wrongdoings of the management companies, 
as well as their controlling shareholders. 
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Making full use of foreign capital and skills 
In order to attract capital, management skills and know-how, the financial 
opening and cooperation related to pension funds, mutual funds, and commercial 
companies should be accelerated. Given the fact that some of the joint venture 
financial companies have not been successful because the Chinese partners are 
industrial companies which lack essential financial talent, only established 
financial companies in China should be allowed to form financial joint ventures, in 
order to absorb advanced managerial expertise and protect our own interests [Wang 
(2001)]. At present, China is drafting detailed plans to attract qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) in one of a series of bold new steps to open up its 
stock market. The QFII scheme is expected to allow qualified foreign institutions 
to set up special accounts at designated banks in China, through which they can 
receive foreign currencies and convert them to renminbi to invest in the local stock 
market [People's Daily (Jim. 12, 2002)]. 
68 
Chapter 6: Experiences of Chile and Singapore and 
the Implications for China 
The social security systems in Chile and Singapore are both fully funded 
defined-contribution compulsory schemes. Their very success has attracted 
considerable attentions, because many industrious and developing countries are 
facing growing financial deficits resulted from PAYGO social security systems. 
6.1 The Pension Reform in Chile 
Chile implemented a revolutionary reform of its social security system in May 
1981. The main ingredient of the Chilean pension reform was the replacement of 
a mature social pension system, operating on a PAYGO basis and facing great 
financial difficulties, with a FF pension system based on individual capitalization 
accounts. The new system is government mandated and regulated but privately 
managed. Its management is entrusted to specialized pension fund management 
companies, known as Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or AFPs. 
Participation in the new system is compulsory for all dependent employed workers, 
including civil servants, but optional for self-employed people. Moreover, 
members of the armed forces continue to have their own pension scheme. At the 
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time of introduction of the new system, participation was also optional for 
members of the old system, although special financial incentives were provided to 
encourage workers to switch to the new system. Thus, the AFP system co-existed 
with the old system for already retired people and those workers who did not 
transfer to the new system and the system for the armed forces. After 20 years 
development, Chile's pension reform achieved great success: the total number of 
affiliates increased from 1.4 million people in 1982 to 3.8 million in 1990; annual 
contributions reached 3.4% of GDP, up from 1.9% in 1982; pension assets 
expanded from 1% in 1981 to 43% in 1994 [Vittas (1996)]. 
6. 2 The Central Provident Fund in Singapore 
The social security scheme named Central Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore 
was set up by the British colonial administration under Central Provident Act and 
came into force in 1955. It is a FF DC mandatory saving plan based on individual 
accounts, which is similar to the AFP system in Chile. However, it had not 
experienced a transition from PAYGO to FF like Chile. In addition, considering 
funds functions and management method, CPF is also very different from Chile's 
AFP scheme. It is not only a single retirement scheme, but a comprehensive 
social protection scheme. The contributions are put into three major accounts: 
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Ordinary, Special, and Medisave. Savings in the Ordinary Account can be used 
for various purposes, including mortgage payments, approved investments, 
insurance, education, and transferring to finance parents' retirement account; the 
Special Account savings are reserved for old age and contingency purposes; and 
the Medisave Account savings enable the members to pay for permitted 
hospitalization cost and premium for health insurance scheme. As of March 2001, 
2.9 million Singaporeans were members of the CPF, and the members' balances 
totaled 90 billion Singapore dollars [Asher and Newman (2001)]. The resources 
of CPF rose from 28% of GDP in 1976 to 76% in 1990 [Vittas (1996)]. 
Different from the decentralized private managed AFP system in Chile, CPF 
in Singapore is a publicly managed scheme. Both administration and investment 
are centrally managed and controlled. Through CPF, the government diverts 
private savings to public investment projects, such as the Public Housing Scheme 
effective in 1968. Moreover, the government adjusts domestic production costs 
by changing the contribution rates of employers, thus adjusts the whole economic 
operation. For instance, in January 1999, the contribution rate was cut from 20 
percent to 10 percent as one of the policy responses to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
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6.3 The Implications for China 
6.3.1 The Similarities between Chile and China, and between Singapore and 
China 
The experiences of Chile and Singapore are valuable for China, since there 
have similarities between these two countries and China in several aspects. We 
first take a look at Chile and China. They are both developing countries with low 
economic levels; both have a centralized government; both had a highly 
fragmented pension system before the transition from PAYGO to FF; both 
countries had a high saving rate in the 1990s. Next, we put the attention on 
Singapore and China. Both are Asian countries dominated by Chinese culture; 
both are controlled under a centralized government; both experienced high 
economic growth during 1980s and 1990s; both have a high savings rate. 
Therefore, the experiences of both Chilean and Singaporean pension reforms 
should have implications for China's future development. 
6.3.2 The Implications for China 
Funded pension system may boost savings 
Statistically, In Chile, the national savings rate was only 10% in 1981 when 
the pension reform just began, while topped 29% in 1996 [Geng (2000)]. In 
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Singapore, national savings rate also mounted to nearly 50% in 1996. Empirically, 
the positive impact of FF pension systems on savings in both Chile and Singapore 
has been shown by the studies noted in Section 2.1.3. This implies that, by 
establishing a funded pension system, China may offset the likely reduction in 
savings resulted from short-run economic objective of stimulating consumption, 
therefore be conducive to achieve long-run economic objective of maintaining a 
high economic growth rate. 
Pension reform without developed financial market 
Chile's experience shows that it is feasible to establish a funded pension 
system in absence of a well-developed financial market. In Chile, with the growth 
of pension funds, many financial market indicators such as FIRs and FMRs moved 
upward, showing a strong correlation with pension fund development [Holzmann 
(1997)]. At present, especially after entry into the WTO, China is speeding up the 
process of standardizing the capital market and deepening the new pension reform 
simultaneously. 
Transition and IPD pre-funding 
Chile's successful pension reform tells China that, the transition from a 
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PAYGO to FF system is totally feasible and the problem of IPD pre-funding can be 
solved not as difficult as imagined. The accumulation of government surplus 
from 1974-1979 in Chile mounted to 5.5% of GDP, which is enough to solve its 
IDP (4.8% of GDP) [Yi (2000)]. In China, there is an increasing government 
deficit rather than surplus in recent years. However, IPD can also be solved 
through several measures mentioned in Section 5.2.3. The low IPD in China 
makes it relatively easy to finance the pension obligations. Therefore, China is in 
a good position to move to a funded pension system, and should not be delayed 
anymore. 
Pension funds investment 
In Singapore, most pension funds are placed in government bonds and other 
debt instruments, with only a small portion going into equities. Recently 
investments in local securities have been relaxed and in foreign securities been 
permitted. Chile did not initially allow pension funds to invest in equities. In 
the mid-1980s, it allowed equity investments first in privatized utilities and then in 
other companies, and recently raised the equity limit to 37% of a pension fund's 
assets. Overseas investment was not allowed in Chile until 1990. Recently, the 
limit for investment in overseas securities is raised to 9% of assets [Vittas (1996)]. 
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In China, whether pension funds should directly or indirectly access into stock 
market is a hotly debated issue. At present, NSSF is only allowed to invest 
indirectly in stock markets through mutual funds. With the development of 
pension fund management institutions, China should permit pension funds to invest 
directly in stock markets. 
Pension funds: public managed vs. private managed 
Due to inefficiency and lack of competition, the public managed CPF in 
Singapore earned a low real rate of return of about 2.7% per year from 1981 to 
1999. On the contrary, private managed APF in Chile achieved very high real 
rates of return, averaging 9.2% per year between 1981 and 1995 [Geng (2000)]. 
Given these experiences, a better way for China to manage its pension funds is: the 
PAYGO part of pillar I should be publicly managed by the Social Security Offices, 
the funded part of pillar I and supplementary enterprise pension of pillar n should 
be privately managed by commercial fund management companies, and the 
individual voluntary savings of pillar IE should be privately managed either by life 
insurance companies or funds management companies. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This thesis has discussed China's pension system: the historical evolvement, 
the current situation, and the future issues. The history provides the background 
while the future makes a blueprint of the current reform. The new partial funded 
"three-pillar" pension system still has many issues to be solved, thus needs further 
reform. Equally important, its future development should be coordinated with 
other economic and institutional reforms, especially the financial market reform. 
Then it has studied the impact of the old PAYGO pension system in China on 
household savings. With two major models based on LCH, the empirical study 
shows the results that, under the old system, the expected pension benefit had a 
negative effect on household savings at both national and urban levels. Moreover, 
this effect is significant in all models except in Model I (A) which uses GDPD-1 as 
deflator. 
The interaction between pension reform and financial market in China has 
been analyzed afterwards. Generally, fully funded pension may have both 
quantitative and qualitative beneficial effects on financial market. In particular, 
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both pension funds and financial market in China are still at a low development 
level. For a vigorous interaction between the two, it is imperative for China to 
take effective measures, such as improving pension fund management and 
regulation, relaxing pension funds investment, developing commercial insurance 
and mutual funds industries etc. Furthermore, the experiences of Chile and 
Singapore have valuable implications for China for the similarities between China 
and these two countries. 
Given both the empirical results in Chapter 4 and the descriptive analysis in 
Chapter 5 & 6, we conclude that the establishment of partial funded “three-pillar” 
pension system in China, that is, a transition from PAYGO to FF system, is the first 
and right step to pension reform and will be conducive to financial market 
development and long-term economic growth. 
However, the study has limitations as well. Firstly, the empirical results in 
Chapter 4 may be adjusted if a longer sample period and a good proxy for expected 
pension benefits could be used. Secondly, the depressive effect of China's old 
pension system on household savings may not be explained by asset substitution 
effect overweighing induced retirement effect as stated by Feldstein (1974), since 
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these pension economics are developed in western countries and may not be 
suitable for China's specific and complicated environment. The psychological 
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Data Appendix 
C UC G GDP DY PE DR UR GDPD GDPD 
Year CRPI 
100 million yuan percent -1 -2 
1978 1759.1 666.7 480.0 3605.6 592.2 17.3 3.3 5.3 0.550 0.481 0.3802 
1979 2005.4 745.7 614.0 4074.0 715.8 32.5 6.0 5.4 0.570 0.491 0.3534 
1980 2317.1 889.8 659.0 4551.3 914.1 50.4 7.8 4.9 0.592 0.520 0.4099 
1981 2604.1 973.3 705.0 4901.4 992.2 62.3 8.7 3.8 0.605 0.533 0.4311 
1982 2867.9 1041.4 770.0 5489.2 1131.1 73.1 9.9 3.2 0.604 0.543 0.4710 
1983 3182.5 1119.1 838.0 6076.3 1256.3 87.3 11.2 2.3 0.611 0.551 0.5237 
1984 3674.5 1288.8 1020.0 7164.4 1564.0 106.1 12.4 1.9 0.641 0.567 0.6039 
1985 4589.0 1667.5 1184.0 8792.1 1854.7 145.6 13.2 1.8 0.706 0.617 0.6837 
1986 5175.0 1965.0 1367.0 10132.8 2371.9 172.2 14.1 2.0 0.738 0.654 0.7417 
1987 5961.2 2331.1 1490.0 11784.7 2773.5 208.1 14.9 2.0 0.775 0.701 0.8272 
1988 7633.1 3159.9 1727.0 14704.0 3386.0 275.1 15.6 2.0 0.870 0.831 0.9205 
1989 8523.5 3603.7 2033.0 16466.0 4063.8 319.4 16.0 2.6 0.947 0.979 0.9594 
1990 9113.2 3984.1 2252.0 18319.5 4559.4 396.2 16.4 2.5 1.000 1.000 1.0000 
1991 10315.9 4676.1 2830.0 21280.4 5194.1 467.5 16.8 2.3 1.067 1.029 1.0912 
1992 12459.8 5888.2 3492.3 25863.7 6560.5 578.5 17.6 2.3 1.151 1.084 1.2445 
1993 15682.4 7815.2 4499.7 34500.7 8595.9 759.3 18.7 2.6 1.319 1.227 1.4078 
1994 20809.8 10501.5 5986.2 46690.7 11992.3 1043.6 19.7 2.8 1.581 1.494 1.5855 
1995 26944.5 13697.4 6690.5 58510.5 15065.0 1305.6 20.8 2.9 1.789 1.714 1.7283 
1996 32152.3 15754.3 7851.6 68330.4 17395.8 1552.2 21.6 3.0 1.895 1.819 1.8968 
1997 34854.6 17417.8 8724.8 74894.2 19087.4 1790.8 22.8 3.1 1.910 1.833 2.0597 
1998 36921.1 19253.8 9484.8 79003.3 20583.9 2073.7 29.1 3.1 1.864 1.786 2.2205 
1999 39334.4 21186.8 10388.3 82673.1 22767.4 2420.9 31.7 3.1 1.820 1.732 2.3799 
2000 42911.9 23529.5 11705.3 89112.5 28790.0 2733.3 34.4 1.706 2.5781 
Notes: 
1. All Chinese yuan variables are in nominal price. 
2. "C" is household consumption; "UC" is urban household consumption; "G" is government 
consumption; "GDP" is gross domestic product; "DY" is urban disposable income; "PE" is 
pension expenditure; "DR" is dependency ratio; "UR" is unemployment rate; "GDPD" is GDP 
deflator; "CRPI" is consumer retail price index. 
Sources: 
Column 2，4: China Economic Yearbook (2001); Column 9: China Labor and Social Security 
Yearbook (2001); Column 10: Econ Database of Economics Department of CUHK; Column 3， 
5，6，7，8, 11,12: China Statistical Yearbook (various editions). 
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Graph 1 ： The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Consumption 
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Graph 2: China's Population Age Structure 
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Graph 3: Population Trend and Dependency Ratio of China (1970-2050) 
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Graph 4: The Interaction between Pension Funds, SOE Reform 
and Financial Market in China 
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Graph 5: Urban Unemployment by Sector in China (1978-2000) 
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Graph 6: The Structure of China's Current Pension System 
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Graph 8: The Trends of Chinese Yuan Term Variables 
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Graph 9: Financial Assets Distribution in China 
(end of 1993 and 1996) 
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Table 1 ： Growing Imbalance between Workers and Pensioners in State-owned 
and Collective Enterprises of China 
System 
Wage Pension Pension-wage 
Workers Pensioners dependency , 
Year expenditure expenditure ratio 
ratio^ 
million persons percent 100 million yuan percent 
1978 95.0 3.14 33 
1979 99.6 5.96 6.0 646.7 
1980 104.4 8.16 7.8 7 7 ^ 6.5 
1981 109.4 9.50 8.7 ^ 7^ 6 
1982 112.8 11.13 9.9 m 8.3 
1983 115.1 12.92 11.2 ^ 9.3 
1984 118.6 14.78 12.4 1129.8 106.1 9.4 
1985 123.1 16.37 13.2 1377.1 145.6 10.5 
1986 127.5 18.05 14.1 1651.3 172.2 10.4 
1987 131.4 19.68 14.9 1868.4 208.1 11.1 
1988 135.1 21.20 15.6 2294.7 275.1 11.9 
1989 136.1 22.01 16.0 2584.6 319.4 12.2 
1990 139.0 23.01 16.4 2905.1 396.2 13.4 
1991 142.9 24.33 16.8 3253.5 467.5 14.1 
1992 145.1 25.98 17.6 3833.6 578.5 14.7 
1993 143.1 27.80 18.7 4662.6 759.3 15.4 
1994 141.0 29.29 19.7 6200.7 1043.6 15.7 
1995 140.4 30.94 20.8 7262.2 1305.6 16.1 
1996 139.0 32.12 21.6 8033.7 1552.2 17.1 
1997 135.9 33.51 22.8 8464.4 1790.8 19.0 
1998 35.94 29.1 7834.1 2073.7 22.3 
1999 99.9 37.27 31.7 8123.5 2420.9 24.5 
2000 93.3 38.76 34.4 8531.9 2733.3 25.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001)，pp. 114, 134-135, 769-770; (1993)，pp. 
817. 
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Table 2: Regression Results - Model I 
I (A) I (B) i H Z ] 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
a � .27557 .43235 .45551 .42255 .41546 .39305 
jlNPT) (4.3971)* (14.3148)* (14.9052)* (18.7065)* (16.2837)* (9.7591)* 
a, -1.0617 -1.3991 -1.4700 -1.4124 - 1 . 3 4 9 3 - 1 . 0 7 9 9 
(G/Y), (-3.8153)* (-7.8587)* (-7.5787)* (-8.3497)* (-7.5984)* (-3.3823)* 
^ .28898 .049780 .053456 .066416 
(¥„,/¥,) (4.5568)* (1.8237) (2.0979)* (2.9403)* 
a , 1460.0 2227.1 2520.0 2186.4 2067.5 2352.4 
(1/r,) (6.6372)* (10.4789)* (15.9962)* (11.3817)* (13.8742)* (8.8877)* 
^ 1.9938 3.4244 4.1427 3.7698 3.5248 5.3535 
(PE/Y), ( 1 . 3 1 9 1 ) ( 3 . 2 1 4 4 ) * ( 3 . 8 0 1 4 ) * ( 4 . 8 1 8 2 ) * ( 3 . 3 2 9 1 ) * ( 6 . 0 3 8 5 ) * 
^ .0011783 -.0010727 -.0021033 .4205E-3 
(DR,) (2.0060)* (-.51544) (-.94856) (.34556) 
^ -.021174 .0029809 .0063291 .0016675 
(UR,) (-16.8148)* (.94923) (2.2501)* (.94714) 
-.20021 -.39327 -.39705 -.39353 -.33167 
P\ (-1.2025) (-2.5063)* (-2.3311)* (-2.5763)* (-2.1379)* 
-.64641 -.67698 -.60144 -.69763 -.68594 
厂2 (-3.8824)* (-4.3143)* (-3.5310)* (-4.5672)* (-4.4215)* 
” D W “ 2.3136 1.9007 1.8955 1.9304 1.9258 1.6941 
Notes: 
1. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
2. Dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to income C / 7 . 
3. * denotes the coefficient is significant at 95% confidence level. 
4. a � , a , , a ” a^, a^, and a^ are the coefficients in equation (12). 
5. p, and p^ are the coefficients of AR(1) and AR(2). 
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Table 3: Regression Results - Model H 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
.067201 .16192 
( /MT) (.42309) (1.2091) 
.41825 .47850 .23765 .32509 
{GIY), (2.4451)* (4.9745)* (2.9559)* (7.4996)* 
.39314 .43451 .30030 .37554 
iy,-^ly.) (3.4868)* (7.7663)* (3.7065)* (6.7502)* 
«3 -149.2201 -177.5430 
(1/^,) (-1.2181) (-1.7357) 
^ 2.3395 2.3440 3.1448 3.6830 
{PEIY), (2.5123)* (2.5380)* (4.3828)* (5.5940)* 
^ -.0026086 -.0024076 -.0033313 -.0031447 
— { D R ^ (-2.0193)* (-2.0065)* (-2.7579)* (-2.3673)* 
^ .052549 . 0 5 2 6 3 7 . 0 5 1 6 9 5 .051520 
m , ) (14.0789)* (14.2061)* (13.6955)* (11.9855)* 
“ -.51227 -.49636 - . 4 3 7 9 9 “ -.29029 
^ (-2.7359)* (-2.5797)* (-2.3996)* (-1.4774) 
-.47824 -.43068 - . 5 1 6 8 0 - . 3 8 8 1 1 
"2 (-2.5542)* (-2.2383)* (-2.8314)* (-1.9752)* 
DW _ 2.2550 2.2312 2.1644 2.0781 一 
Notes: 
1. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
2. Dependent variable is the ratio of private consumption to income C/Y. 
3. * denotes the coefficient is significant at 95% confidence level. 
4. « 0 ， , «3, and a^ are the coefficients in equation (13) 
Pi and P2 are the coefficients of AR( 1) and AR(2). 
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Table 4: Private Pension Funds in Latin American Countries 
Total assets (million US$) Percentage of GDP (%) 
1998 2005* 2015* 1998 2005* 2015* 
Argentina 11526 57638 181942 3.5 12.8 26.1 
Bolivia 367 4215 8538 4.1 32.0 41.8 
Brazil 78308 104583 279541 9.5 15.3 26.4 
Chile 31366 60127 126345 39.7 49.0 54.8 
Colombia 1950 13961 58080 2.1 11.2 30.0 
Mexico 9256 53106 165001 2.7 12.4 28.6 
Peru 1723 8005 25302 2.5 8.9 18.9 
Uruguay 361 1646 4200 1.3 4.5 7.8 
Total 
135471 303172 848949 7.6 15.5 28.6 
amount/Average 
* Estimates 
Source: Wang (2001)，pp. 5, table 1. 
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Table 5: Pension Fund Assets in OECD Countries 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
UK 17 15 23 47 55 
USA 17 20 24 37 43 
Germany 2 2 2 3 3 
Japan 0 1 2 4 5 
Canada 13 13 17 23 28 
Netherlands 29 36 46 68 77 
Sweden 22 29 30 29 28 
Switzerland 38 41 51 59 69 
Denmark 5 5 7 12 15 
Australia 10 8 9 14 19 
Source: Davis (1995), pp. 55, table 3.2. 
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